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CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.: THE
OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR
JUDICIAL RECUSAL
Jonathan H. Todt*
On June 8, 2009, the Supreme Court ruled on the fascinating
legal saga of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.' The particular-and
seemingly outrageous-facts of the case garnered a tremendous
amount of national attention 2 and even inspired a John Grisham
novel.3 At issue in the case was the failure of Justice Brent Benjamin
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to recuse himself from
hearing an appeal involving a fifty million dollar judgment against the
company of his largest campaign contributor-Don Blankenship, the
chairman, CEO, and President of A.T. Massey Coal. Blankenship
spent roughly three million dollars of his own personal wealth during
the election-an incredibly large amount for any state election, and
for West Virginia in particular-to help elect Benjamin to the bench
in place of Justice Warren McGraw during the 2004 elections. 4 Natu-
rally, the plaintiff moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin based on the
apparent conflict of interest and probable bias caused by Blanken-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., Political
Science, University of Notre Dame, 2006. Many thanks to ProfessorJay Tidmarsh for
assistance in crafting the scope of this Note. I would also like to thank Erin and
Finley, my parents Harry and Cathy, and my brother Michael for their unceasing love,
patience, and support.
1 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
2 See Robert Barnes, Case May Define When a Judge Must Recuse Self, WASH. POST,
Mar. 2, 2009, at Al; Adam Liptak, U.S. Supreme Court Is Asked to Fix Troubled West Vir-
ginia Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A41;James Sample, Op-Ed., Justice for
Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2008, at A24; Lawrence Messina, Legal Groups Blast W. Va.
Justice in Massey Case, CHARLESTON DAiLY MAIL, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.dailymail.
com/News/200808050215.
3 JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008); see alsoJoan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court,
a Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009, at Al (explaining back-
ground of the case and connection to Grisham's novel); Paul J. Nyden, Novel Linked to
State Election, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 2008, at IA (detailing John Grisham's
appearance on the Today Show, explaining the idea behind the novel).
4 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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ship's campaign involvement.5  Nonetheless, Justice Benjamin
declined to remove himself from the case on three separate occasions
and was the deciding vote in a 3-2 reversal of the fifty million dollar
trial verdict against Massey.6 On November 14, 2008, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari7 to address the question of
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
violated when Justice Benjamin denied a recusal motion.8
Part I of this Note will examine the Caperton case and the new
recusal rule based on "probability of bias," which was derived from the
case. Part II will explore and scrutinize the concerns expressed by
ChiefJustice Roberts in his dissent-that the majority's holding in this
case would lead to an overwhelming number and variety of "Caperton
motions" from parties asserting that the judge in their particular case
is biased, primarily because the majority did not provide sufficient
guidelines through which to examine future probability of bias
claims.9 While only a year has passed since the Court's ruling in the
case, is there any evidence to suggest that state legal systems are strug-
gling with this recusal standard? Was the ChiefJustice's use of the old
legal aphorism that "[h]ard cases make bad law" justified in this
case?10 Part II will also address the Chief Justice's second concern-
that this decision will bring the judicial system into unnecessary disre-
pute because constant attacks on judicial impartiality will erode public
confidence in the system.11 I argue that lower courts dealing with this
new probability of bias standard neither struggle with the content nor
overall quantity of so-called "Caperton motions." The use of the
probability of bias standard is rare and will neither overwhelm courts
nor bring undue disrepute to the bench. 12
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2258.
7 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).
8 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256 (2008).
9 See id. at 2272-73 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
10 See id. at 2272.
11 See id.
12 A related topic, but one outside the scope of this Note, is the role judicial
elections play in maintaining judicial impartiality as a whole. Even in cases where
there are no egregious campaign contributions to a candidate, bias issues can arise
from the normal campaign conduct of a candidate. The Supreme Court held in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002), that it was a violation
of the First Amendment for a state's canon of judicial conduct to prevent judicial
candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. Voters
frequently wish to know a candidate's views on controversial political issues. After
hearing unequivocal statements about a candidate's views, how can the public expect
the judge to approach the issue freshly on the bench? Originally, judicial elections
r. 0 r_:.
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I. CAPERTON v. A.T. MASsEY COAL Co.
A. Background
This matter originated in 2002, when a West Virginia jury deliv-
ered a verdict against A.T. Massey Coal Co. ("Massey") for fifty million
dollars in compensatory and punitive damages for fraudulent misrep-
resentation, concealment, and tortious interference with existing con-
tractual relationships.1 3 Hugh Caperton charged Massey with various
efforts to intentionally ruin his business-also a coal operation-
through fraudulent dealings and by cutting off existing contractual
relations with the petitioners such that Caperton's business would be
forced into bankruptcy.14 Over the next few years, the trial court
denied Massey's post-trial motions challenging the jury verdict and
were implemented in the nineteenth century to make judges accountable to the pop-
ulace and the rule of law rather than to the appointing governor or legislature. See
Charles G. Geyh, John F. Kimberling Professor of Law, Ind. Univ. Sch. Of Law, Mod-
erator at Panel 1: Judicial Selection Systems and the Judicial Canons of Ethics (Oct.
17, 2007), in 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1347, 1356 (2008). Yet, many dispute whether
these goals are still being accomplished through judicial elections and whether a
change to meritorious judicial selection-or some other system-would be prefera-
ble. See Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit Selection, 32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 67,
88-94 (2009) (identifying the shortcomings of judicial elections and arguing for
merit selection as a better alternative). This is an active debate involving many pre-
eminent legal thinkers. Some-most notably retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor-
believe that the elimination of state judicial election is necessary to retain a respected,
impartial judiciary free from the potential corrupting influence of campaign contri-
butions. See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that "the very practice of electing judges undermines [the State's interest in
an impartial judiciary]"); Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Retired, U.S.
Supreme Court, Closing Remarks to the Debate over Judicial Elections and State
Court Judicial Selection (Oct. 17, 2007), in 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1347, 1419
(2008) (arguing that reforms are necessary for judicial elections and "preservation of
the status quo is probably not our best option or even a good idea"). Others believe
that strengthened state recusal rules-which can differ greatly between states-or
more articulated standards of judicial conduct would succeed in accomplishing a
more impartial judiciary. See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 792-96 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (arguing that states should be free to elect judges if they choose and
that articulated standards of judicial conduct are appropriate and sufficient to main-
tainjudicial integrity); Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges
and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REV.
691, 707-11 (2007) ("[I]n most jurisdictions, existing recusal standards are too con-
stricted to be effective in attaining an independent and impartial third branch.");
Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping Up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code ofJudi-
cial Conduct's Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS, 441, 449-54 (2006).
13 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
14 Brief for Petitioners at 3-5, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22).
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damages and requesting judgment as a matter of law.15 Prior to Mas-
sey's appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however,
were the 2004 state judicial elections, during which Don Blanken-
ship-the chairman, CEO, and president of Massey-sought to
replace Justice Warren McGraw with a relatively unknown Charleston
lawyer named Brent Benjamin. 16
Blankenship contributed roughly three million dollars to Benja-
min's campaign.17 First, Blankenship contributed $1,000 directly to
Benjamin's campaign committee-the statutory maximum allowed. I,
In addition, he donated $2.5 million to the § 527 political organiza-
tion named "And For The Sake Of The Kids." 19 Blankenship created
this organization after the trial verdict against Massey for the sole pur-
pose of unseating Justice McGraw and electing Benjamin in his
place.20 This money was primarily used to finance campaign adver-
tisements, many of which accused Justice McGraw of being soft on
crime. 2' Finally, Blankenship also spent over $500,000 on indepen-
dent campaign expenditures, such as direct mailings and television
advertisements, seeking support for Benjamin in the election.22
These contributions were "more than the total spent by all other
Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin's
own committee."23 In fact, the contributions by Blankenship to "And
For The Sake Of The Kids" were the largest by any one person or
group to a § 527 organization in any state judicial race in 2004.24 The
donations by Blankenship had their intended effect, as Benjamin beat
McGraw by a tally of 382,036 votes (53.3%) to 334,301 votes
(46.7%).25
15 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 14, at 6-7.
21 Id. at 7. In their brief, the petitioners described how the name "And For The
Sake Of The Kids" related to the group's continued assertions that Justice McGraw
was "soft on crime," particularly as it resulted in crimes against children. One such ad
released by the group accused McGraw of voting to release a convicted child molester,
thus allowing him to work in a high school. Id.
22 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
23 Id.
24 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 14, at 28; see RACHEL WEISs, NAT'L INST. ON
MONEY IN STATE PoLmcs, FRINGE TACTICS 5 (2005), available at http://www.followthe
money.org/press/Reports/200508251.pdf.
25 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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In October 2005, prior to Massey filing its appeal with the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Caperton moved to disqualify
Benjamin under the West Virginia Code ofJudicial Conduct 26 and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 Yet Benjamin
denied this motion and, after examining his own supposed biases,
held there was "'no objective information... to show that this Justice
has a bias for or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the
matters which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be any-
thing but fair and impartial."' 28 Soon thereafter, Massey filed its
appeal on the fifty million dollar jury verdict, which the court reversed
by a 3-2 margin in November 2007.29 Justice Benjamin was in the
majority.30
Caperton sought a rehearing, and the parties collectively peti-
tioned for the disqualification of Benjamin and two other justices who
ruled on the case. Caperton successfully moved for the recusal ofJus-
tice Maynard, who was photographed vacationing with Blankenship in
the French Riviera.31 In addition, Massey successfully moved for the
recusal of Justice Starcher, who had been publicly critical of the role
Blankenship had played in the 2004 election of Justice Benjamin.3 2
However, Justice Benjamin again refused to recuse himself from the
matter.33 During the rehearing-and with two lower court judges
replacing the other disqualified justices-the court again reversed by
a 3-2 margin with Justice Benjamin in the majority. 34 For a third time
Caperton moved for disqualification, and for a third time Benjamin
denied this request.35
26 SeeW. VA. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) & cmt. (1993), available at
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/JIC/Codejc.htm ("A judge shall respect and comply
with the law, shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge's activities, and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. ... The test for appearance of
impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception
that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality,
and competence is impaired.").
27 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
28 Id. at 2258 (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 336a-37a,
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22)).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
2o011]
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Justice Benjamin wrote a concurring opinion to this decision, first
reviewing his agreement with the majority on the merits of the case,3 6
then writing a lengthy defense of his refusal to recuse himself.37 Jus-
tice Benjamin rejected the argument of the dissenting opinion that
apparent conflicts of interest can implicate due process considera-
tions.38 Rather, Benjamin wrote that actual justice, rather than appar-
ent justice, should be the standard by which recusal is measured.3 9
Furthermore, examining his own bias and prejudged opinions on the
matter, Benjamin determined that "I have no pecuniary interest in the
outcome of this matter.. . . I have no conflicting dual role in this
matter.... I have no personal involvement with nor harbor any per-
sonal antipathy toward any party or counsel herein."40 It was upon the
question of whether due process was implicated in Benjamin's failure
to recuse himself that the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 41
B. The Supreme Court Develops Expanded Due Process Requirement for
Judicial Recusal Based on the Probability of Bias
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals decision and held that under "these
extreme facts the probability of actual bias [rose] to an unconstitu-
tional level" and required Justice Benjamin to recuse himself despite
his subjective assertions that no actual bias was involved.42 Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy held that any subjective examination by
ajudge is merely one step in the process for the examination of bias-
"objective standards may also require recusal whether or not actual
bias exists or can be proved."43
Traditionally, the Due Process Clause was held to incorporate the
common law rule that recusal is required when a judge has "'a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest"' in a case.44 This rule was
36 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 287-92 (W. Va. 2008) (Ben-
jamin, Acting C.J., concurring), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
37 Id. at 292-309.
38 See id. at 293 n.14 ("While appearances should be considered in a discussion of
public confidence in the judiciary, appearances alone, subject as they are to manipu-
lation by partisan elements (including litigants), should never alone serve as the basis
for a due process challenge to an otherwise well-founded legal opinion of a court of
law.").
39 Id. at 294.
40 Id. at 296.
41 See Caperion, 129 S. Ct. at 2256.
42 See id. at 2265.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 2259 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)); see alsoJohn
P. Frank, Disqualification ofJudges, 56 YA L.J. 605, 609 (1947) ("The common law of
[VOL. 86: 1
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seen to "reflect[ ] the maxim that '[n]o man is allowed to be a judge
in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judg-
ment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity."' 45 This standard
"demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications" 4 6
and due to various state codes ofjudicial conduct, "most disputes over
disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution."
4 7
However, two situations have been recognized by the Court where
recusal is required as an objective matter, absent any subjective exami-
nation by the judge of his or her own bias.
The first situation previously recognized by the Court involves a
judge with an indirect pecuniary interest in the case considered less
than the "direct, personal, substantial" interest required for recusal at
common law.4 8 This standard emerged in Tumey v. Ohio,49 where a
village mayor also sat as ajudge, without ajury, to try those accused of
violating certain Prohibition-era alcohol laws.50 The mayor/judge
received personal compensation for performing these judicial duties
in the form of a percentage of the fines handed down for the infrac-
tions. Thus, because no fines were levied against acquitted parties,
there was "no way by which the Mayor [could] be paid for his service
as a judge, if he [did] not convict those who [were] brought before
him. '5 1 Also, the proceeds from the fines were given to the treasury of
the village to contribute to general village improvements, for which
the mayor was ultimately responsible.5 2 The Court held that it was a
denial of due process for the accused to be subjected to a procedure
"which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defen-
dant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
disqualification ... was clear and simple: ajudge was disqualified for direct pecuniary
interest and for nothing else.").
45 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (second alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
46 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986).
47 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267. The American Bar Association's Model Code of
Judicial Conduct-some variation of which is used by all American court systems and
is usually incorporated into state law-provides ethical standards designed to lead a
biased judge to recusal. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2004);
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION § 2.8 (2d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2009);
Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial
Independence, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1260 (2008).
48 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259-61.
49 273 U.S. 510.
50 See id. at 520.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 521-22.
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true between the State and the accused."53 Further cases emphasized
that the judge's financial interest need not be direct 5 4 nor have actu-
ally influenced the judge55 to be a violation of due process.
The second situation previously recognized by the Court as
requiring recusal emerged from criminal contempt proceedings
where a judge has no financial interest in the case, but where his par-
ticipation in an earlier proceeding could lead to a conflict of inter-
est.56 The Court referred to In re Murchison,57 where a judge
examined two defendants to determine whether charges should be
brought against them, as a "one-man grand jury. '58 The judge
charged one man with contempt for failure to adequately answer
questions asked by the judge and proceeded to try and convict both
defendants after this contempt charge had been leveled.5 9 The Court
threw out these convictions on the grounds that, having been a part of
the decision whether or not to try the defendants, the judge could not
be "wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those
accused." 60 Furthermore, in Maybeny v. Pennsylvanid61 the Court held
that due process required a defendant in criminal contempt proceed-
ings be tried "before a judge other than the one reviled by the con-
temnor."62 Thus, in a case where a defendant verbally attacked the
judge by calling him, among other things, a "dirty sonofabitch" 63 and
a "dirty, tyrannical old dog,"64 there existed a due process require-
ment that the judge recuse himself for the adjudication of these
charges. 65 Much like the group of indirect financial interest cases, the
bias inquiry is an objective one.66 "The Court asks not whether the
judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in
53 Id. at 532.
54 See Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (holding that the levy-
ing by a mayor/judge of fines that would benefit the town treasury is a due process
violation under Tumey, even without direct compensation to the mayor/judge).
55 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (clarifying that the
Court was "not required to decide whether in fact [the judge] was influenced," but
only whether his position would offer a temptation to an average judge not to rule
fairly).
56 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2261-62 (2009).
57 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
58 Id. at 133.
59 Id. at 134-35.
60 Id. at 137.
61 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
62 Id. at 466.
63 Id. at 456.
64 Id. at 457.
65 Id. at 466.
66 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009).
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his position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitu-
tional 'potential for bias.'
67
The Court applied this objective inquiry to the problem of poten-
tial bias relating to state judicial elections. The Court acknowledged
the "probing search into his actual motives and inclinations" con-
ducted by Justice Benjamin and did not question his subjective find-
ings of impartiality. 68 Neither did the Court examine whether or not
there was actual bias shown by Justice Benjamin on behalf of Massey
and Blankenship in his judicial decisionmaking. 69 Rather, the Court
held that a subjective, inward examination by a judge is not sufficient
alone to satisfy due process requirements: "objective standards may
also require recusal whether or not actual bias exists or can be
proved."70 To define these objective standards, "the Court has asked
whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or pre-
judgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.' 7
The Court emphasized that this need for objective rules exists as
"protection against a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends"
his or her true motives while trying a case.72 It would be a nearly
impossible task for the law to adequately review a judge's own subjec-
tive inquiry into actual bias; therefore, objective standards based on
the probability of bias-and which requires no actual proof of bias-
are appropriate. 73 The objective inquiry examines the position of the
hypothetical "average judge" and asks whether there exists an uncon-
stitutional potential for bias.7 4
C. Application of the Objective Probability of Bias Standard to Justice
Benjamin's Failure to Recuse Himself
Previously, the Supreme Court had only noted two instances
when due process required a judge to recuse himself as an objective
matter absent any findings of actual bias-when the judge obtains an
indirect financial interest in the outcome and in certain criminal con-
tempt proceedings. 75 To this framework, the Caperton Court added an
67 Id.
68 See id. at 2263.
69 See id. at 2265.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2262.
75 See supra Part I.B.
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objective standard based on the probability of actual bias-thus
rejecting subjective assertions by each judge regarding his or her own
biases. 76 The Court goes to great lengths to emphasize that the facts
under consideration in this case are exceptional, and that
"[a]pplication of the constitutional standard implicated in this case
will thus be confined to rare instances."7 7 In fact, perhaps cognizant
of the delicate constitutional debate surrounding the balancing of
campaign finance regulations with free speech concerns, 78 the Court
states that "[n] ot every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney
creates a probability of bias that requires . . . recusal."79
When determining whether campaign contributions made to a
judicial candidate rise to the level in which there is a serious
probability of bias, the Court's analysis "centers on the contribution's
relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed
to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the elec-
tion."80 The size of the campaign contributions-primarily through
76 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
77 Id. at 2267. This point is also noted-with some degree of skepticism-by
Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent. See id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The
ChiefJustice is concerned about the boundless nature of this new objective standard,
its possible effect in future cases, and public confidence regarding the impartiality of
the judiciary. See id. at 2267-74. For more on the concerns of ChiefJustice Roberts-
including his position that the majority left many questions crucially unanswered con-
cerning the application of this test-and the possible future implications of this rul-
ing, see infra Part II.
78 The debate over the legality and desirability of campaign finance reform is far
outside the scope of this Note. It remains sufficient for this piece to understand that
the Court has neither condemned campaign donations for judicial elections, nor
placed restrictions on the donations that individuals or corporations-litigants at bar
or otherwise-can make to judicial campaigns. It merely strengthens the due process
requirements for an impartial judiciary when a litigant appears before a judge to
whom he has extravagantly donated campaign funds. This decision not to strengthen
the restrictions on this limited type of campaign finance is consistent with the general
consensus of legal commentators that momentum-particularly from the Roberts
Court-is moving away from campaign finance restrictions. See, e.g., Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Richard Briffault, Davis v. FEC: The Roberts Court's Con-
tinuing Attack on Campaign Finance Reform, 44 TULSA L. REv. 475, 476 (2009); Frances
R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the Balance of Powers: A New Framework for Campaign
Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin Right to Life, 27 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 267,
267-68 (2008); Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 599, 600-01; Emma Greenman, Note,
Strengthening the Hands of Voters in the Marketplace of Ideas: Roadmap to Campaign Finance
Reform in a Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era, 24J.L. & POL. 209, 210-11 (2008).
79 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
80 Id. at 2264.
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the § 527 group "And For The Sake Of The Kids"-in relation to the
total amount of money spent and collected during the campaign was
undisputed. The three million dollars spent by Blankenship in his bid
to elect Benjamin was 300% more than the amount spent by Benja-
min's campaign committee during the entire election.
81
A more contentious issue arose in determining the apparent
effect that Blankenship's campaign contributions had on the outcome
of the election. Both Massey, in the Brief for Respondents, andJustice
Benjamin, in his concurrence to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals decision, argued that Blankenship's contributions were not
the primary reason for the election victory.8 2 The Brief for Respon-
dents argued that even if the "probability of bias" standard were to be
applied to this set of facts, there was still insufficient evidence to war-
rant a recusal. 83 Evidently the majority of West Virginia newspapers
endorsed Benjamin, and there was also a perception that Justice
McGraw was a polarizing figure prone to seemingly bizarre antics and
campaign activities. 84 Challenging the suggestion that Benjamin may
owe a "debt of gratitude" to Blankenship and Massey for the role they
played in his election, Massey argued thatJustice McGraw was more to
blame for his own loss and that 'Justice Benjamin's largest 'debt of.
gratitude' may therefore have been to his opponent."8
5
Justice Benjamin also gave little weight to the campaign contribu-
tions that aided his election to the bench and listed ten factors which
supposedly supported his contention that he did not err in failing to
recuse himself.86 In fact, Benjamin asserted that not only was he
under no duty to recuse himself from this matter, but that "in West
Virginia, elected judges have a duty to hear cases unless disqualifica-
tion is required."87 He went on to argue-among other things-that
his election in 2004 "was due primarily to [his] campaign's message of
fairness, stability and predictability in decision-making, the impor-
tance of the rule of law to courts, and the need for judges to exercise
civility, integrity and personal professionalism." 88 Benjamin also
81 Id.
82 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 299-304 (W. Va. 2008)
(Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); Brief for Respon-
dents at 54-55, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22).
83 Brief for Respondents, supra note 82, at 49-56.
84 See id. at 54-55.
85 Id.
86 See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 299-301 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring).
87 Id. at 299 (citing W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3(A), 3(B) (1)
(1993)).
88 Id.
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emphasized the devastating effect of a speech given by then-Justice
McGraw in Racine, West Virginia which was described as a "rant[ ] ,89
"'deeply disturbing,' 90 and "unhinged."91 It was these factors,
argued Benjamin, and not the three million dollars in Blankenship
campaign funds that ultimately tipped the election in his favor at the
expense of Justice McGraw. Thus, even if this disqualification matter
rose to a constitutional level of scrutiny-which he denied as a matter
of law92-Benjamin argued that the facts of the election did not sup-
port the suggestion that the campaign donations were the cause of his
victory.93
However, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments and held
that the question of whether the campaign contributions actually
caused Benjamin's election victory was irrelevant.94 The proper
inquiry is "whether the contributor's influence on the election under
all the circumstances 'would offer a possible temptation to the average
... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true." 9 5 In such a close election, "Blankenship's campaign contribu-
tions-in comparison to the total amount contributed to the cam-
paign, as well as the total amount spent in the election-had a
significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral out-
come."96 Thus, the risk and probability that this influence created
actual bias-despite Benjamin's subjective assertions to the contrary-
is such that the due process protections require that he be removed
from the judicial proceeding.97
The Court went on to examine the temporal elements of this
case, noting that these campaign contributions were made when
Blankenship's company was filing an appeal to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals that would be heard after the conclusion
of the election.98 Thus, these contributions were made when Blank-
enship had a clear interest in the outcome. 'Just as no man is allowed
to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when-
without the consent of the other parties-a man chooses the judge in
89 Id. at 302 n.38.
90 Id. (quoting an unnamed "political consultant").
91 Id.
92 See id. at 294-97.
93 Id. at 299-302.
94 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009).
95 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1927)).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 2265.
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his own cause."99 Therefore, the objective probability of bias that
emerged from this set of facts required the recusal ofJustice Benjamin
as a matter of due process. 100
II. THE DISSENT OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: NEED COURTS
BE CONCERNED?
In addition to disagreeing with the majority on the legal question
of whether the Due Process Clause requires recusal due to a
probability of bias, 10 1 Chief Justice Roberts painted an unmistakably
dreary picture of the consequences he believed would emerge from
the majority's decision in this case.10 2 While he "share[d] the major-
ity's sincere concerns about the need to maintain a fair, independent,
and impartial judiciary-and one that appears to be such," 10 3 he also
believed that this decision "will do far more to erode public confi-
dence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a
99 Id.
100 Sadly for poor Caperton, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, on
remand, again reversed the ruling of the trial court. Through personnel changes on
the court, only one of the original justices took part in this remanded proceeding. In
fact, Massey picked up a vote, winning the remanded proceeding 4-1. See Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 357 (W. Va. 2009).
101 The Chief Justice viewed the Due Process Clause as providing a floor for judi-
cial recusal requirements, with each state "free to adopt broader recusal rules than
the Constitution requires." See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing). Thus, he argued, it is within the power of legislative discretion to consider what
situations and types of bias require recusal in each state. See id. at 2268. "Subject to
the two well-established exceptions described above, questions ofjudicial recusal are
regulated by 'common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and
bar.'" Id. (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997)).
102 See id. at 2267-74.
103 Id. at 2267. However, the Chief Justice did not believe that the facts here were
such that they constituted an "extreme case" that would require a due process evalua-
tion, even if the probability of bias standard was the appropriate standard to apply.
He cited the fact that, aside from the $1000 direct contribution to the Benjamin cam-
paign allowed under West Virginia law, "Justice Benjamin and his campaign had no
control over how this money was spent." Id. at 2273 (emphasis omitted). Not only
would it be inappropriate to require recusal from ajudge due to the actions of a third
party, he argued, but there is never any guarantee that these independent expendi-
tures would even assist the campaign as a whole. See id. The Chief Justice also chal-
lenged the claim that these funds were "disproportionate" citing smaller-but still
significant-contributions made by other private parties to both Benjamin andJustice
McGraw's campaign. Id. at 2273-74. Finally, the ChiefJustice repeated the argument
of Justice Benjamin and Massey that it was Benjamin's successful campaign and
McGraw's erratic and disturbing behavior that tipped the balance of the race, not any
campaign spending made by a third party. Id. at 2274.
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particular case."' 0 4 Cautioning that, in this case, "the cure is worse
than the disease,"'10 5 the Chief Justice was primarily concerned with
two consequences. First, due to the majority's unwillingness or inabil-
ity to craft a truly objective test that can be applied to future deci-
sions, 106 the ChiefJustice was worried that state courts will be flooded
with so-called "Caperton motions" in which a litigant challenges the
impartiality of their judge for a host of reasons. 10 7 Second, the Chief
Justice was of the belief that allowing a "probability of bias" standard
to determine when due process requires judicial recusal "will itself
bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the
confidence of the American people in the fairness and integrity of
their courts."10 8
The Chief Justice presented forty questions in his dissent that he
believed lower courts would be forced to answer regarding the scope
and application of this probability of bias standard. 10 9 Among them
are "[w]hat level of contribution or expenditure gives rise to a
'probability of bias'?"; 110 how to determine when an expenditure is
disproportionate;"1 how long the probability of bias lasts;112 whether
the judge's vote on the case must be outcome determinative in order
for the standard to apply;"I 3 whether there is an assumption that
judges will feel bias towards opponents of their campaign; 1 4 whether
the probability of bias applies to all judicial elections, including non-
partisan and retention elections;'1 5 and whether the judge may
respond to a bias allegation or whether his reputation lies in the
hands of the litigants.1 1 6
104 Id. at 2267.
105 Id. at 2274.
106 Id. at 2269 ("[T]he standard the majority articulates-'probability of bias'-
fails to provide clear, workable guidance for future cases. At the most basic level, it is
unclear whether the new probability of bias standard is somehow limited to financial
support in judicial elections, or applies to judicial recusal questions more generally.").
107 Id. at 2272.
108 Id. at 2274.
109 See id. at 2269-72.
110 Id. at 2269.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 2270.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2271. For a more comprehensive database cataloging the methods by
which the judiciary is selected in every state, see Judicial Selection in the States, AM.
JuDIcATuRE SoC'y, htip://www.judicialselection.us (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
116 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, agreed with the Chief
Justice insofar as "'[t]he Due Process Clause demarks only the outer
boundaries ofjudicial disqualifications."' 1 1 7 He also agreed that states
"'remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disquali-
fication than those we find mandated here today."' 118 Thus, because
states' codes of conduct and statutes inevitably restrict more activity
than the Due Process Clause alone, "[a]pplication of the constitu-
tional standard implicated in [ Caperton] will . . .be confined to rare
instances."119 He also noted that the previous recusal standards devel-
oped by the Court, as required by due process, implicitly contained
similar unanswered questions about scope and application. 120 How-
ever, after those decisions "the Court was not flooded with Monroeville
or Murchison motions.... Courts proved quite capable of applying the
standards to less extreme situations."'12 1 Are courts today likely to be
flooded with these " Caperton motions"? If so, will they be able to apply
the standard introduced in Caperton to those facts without strict gui-
dance from the Court regarding the specifics of the test?
An early look at judicial decisions which cite to Caperton illustrate
that lower courts have neither been overwhelmed with Caperton
motions nor had much difficulty applying the probability of bias test
to the specific facts at bar. It is my contention that as time passes,
courts will become increasingly adept at handling Caperton-like
motions and begin-through application and practice-to supply
answers to many of the Chief Justice's forty questions. Perhaps then
the Chief Justice will be less concerned with the aphorism "[h]ard
cases make bad law" 122 and come to believe that cases based on
extreme fact patterns provide the Court an excellent opportunity to
set standards and limits of the due process requirements for a fair trial
and impartial tribunal. The ChiefJustice feared that "[t] he end result
[of the majority's decision would] do far more to erode public confi-
dence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a
particular case."' 23 However, public confidence in an impartial judici-
ary has perhaps already eroded to a greater extent than the Chief Jus-
tice is aware. A Harris Interactive Poll conducted prior to this case
found that sixty-eight percent of those polled would doubt a judge's
117 Id. at 2267 (majority opinion) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
813, 828 (1986)).
118 Id. (quoting Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2266.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 2267.
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impartiality if a party spent $50,000 (which is 1.67% of the three mil-
lion dollars spent by Blankenship) in campaign contributions to elect
the judge. 124 In addition, eighty-five percent felt the judge should
step aside if asked to rule on a campaign contributor of that magni-
tude.1 25 While Justice Benjamin asserted that such "push-polls" are
"neither credible nor sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for an
elected judge's disqualification," 126 such polls certainly lend credibil-
ity to the idea that the public has a declining faith in the impartiality
of the judiciary and that new rules need to be put in place to allay
these concerns. 127
A. Early Court Rulings Favor a Narrow Application of Caperton,
Adhering to the "Extreme Facts" Language
As of October 19, 2010,128 there were 105 reported 129 cases 130-
at both the state and federal levels-that have cited Caperton. Not all
124 See Press Release, Justice at Stake, Poll: Huge Majority Wants Firewall Between
Judges, Election Backers (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/
pressreleases.cfm/pollhuge-majoritywantsjfirewall between-judges election_
backers?show=news&newsID=5677 [hereinafter Press Release].
125 See id.
126 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 292 n.11 (W. Va. 2008)
(Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
127 Obviously, the newest constitutional due process requirement for the recusal
of judges is just one-narrow-solution to this problem. For more on judicial elec-
tions and their role in the public's view of the impartiality of the judiciary, see gener-
ally The Debate Over Judicial Elections, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1347 (2008).
128 I am cognizant thatjust over one year has passed since the Court handed down
its decision in Caperton. Not only does this limit the amount of time that courts have
had to cite to the case, but it also limits the time that attorneys have had to make
arguments based on Caperton in support of their clients. In fact, it is entirely possible
that some of the most difficult cases that would implicate Caperton concerns have yet
to be decided and may not have even occurred. However, that does not, in my opin-
ion, make an early examination of the case's effects unnecessary or irrelevant. What
the early cases show, with some confidence, is that the lower courts are more than
capable of examining the majority's holding in Caperton and applying it to the facts
presented before them. AsJustice Kennedy wrote, concerning the ability of the lower
courts to apply previous due process standards expounded by the Court in Tumey,
Murchison, and Monroeville, "[c] ourts proved quite capable of applying the standards
to less extreme situations." Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266.
129 I make no effort through this Note to consider or examine any "reported case
bias" that may exist and could result in potential over- or underreporting of Caperton-
related cases. My sole purpose is to produce an early examination of how courts inter-
pret the Caperton decision.
130 I choose to examine case results rather than briefings for two reasons. First,
the cases themselves will create a clearer picture as to the legal framework being built
by lower courts' interpretations of the Caperton decision. While attorneys may put
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cases were responsive to the issue ofjudicial bias. 31 In addition, none
of the cases dealing with judicial bias and recusal used the Caperton
precedent to actually grant a party's motion to disqualify the judge.
This illustrates that the lower courts, at least at this early stage, are
heeding the majority's guidance that Caperton, and its constitutional
standard, is to be "confined to rare instances" 13 2 involving "extreme
facts." 13 3 They are seemingly reluctant to extend this standard beyond
the narrow holding and fact pattern of Caperton, perhaps taking into
consideration the Chief Justice's assertion that "'[a]ll questions of
judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity.' "13 4
Of the cases dealing with judicial bias and recusal issues, few are
directly analogous to the facts in Caperton. In E.L DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Aquamar S.A.,' 135 the court, in a short per curiam decision,
held that campaign contributions totaling $4560 from the defendant's
attorneys to the judge in their case did not amount to legally sufficient
grounds for the disqualification of ajudge.13 6 The contributions were
forward exotic and unconventional theories to best serve their clients, only judicial
decisions will provide clarity on the true meaning of Caperton. Second, with no effec-
tive way to thoroughly check pleadings from all fifty states, an examination of plead-
ings would rely on those federal pleadings electronically uploaded to Westlaw, Pacer,
or some other service. With no state pleadings and only a handful of federal plead-
ings, any study of Caperton's effects would be fatally incomplete. While Chief Justice
Roberts was understandably concerned about the number of court motions which
could emerge from this decision, I will rely on cases to assess its effects.
131 For example, in Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009) (Timmons-Goodson,
J., dissenting), a dissenting justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court cites Rob-
erts's dissent in Caperton to assert that special exceptions to the law should not be
made for sympathetic parties. Id. at 325 ("'Extreme cases often test the bounds of
established legal principles. There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the
extreme case, rather than adhering to the legal principle.'" (quoting Caperton, 129. S.
Ct. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting))). This was in reference to the court finding a
statute preventing convicted felons from owning firearms constitutionally unreasona-
ble as applied to the petitioner, who was convicted of a nonviolent drug crime thirty
years earlier and who had never been accused or convicted of being violent in any
way. See id. at 321-23. Also, in Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Secretary of Health & Human
Seruices, 88 Fed. Cl. 706 (2009), Caperton is cited to establish the parties' basic constitu-
tional due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal. See id. at 719 n.22 (citing
Caperton, 129. S. Ct. at 2266). Undoubtedly, Caperton will continue to be cited in
similar ways that are not responsive to examining the question of what activity merits
recusal as a constitutional matter.
132 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
133 Id. at 2265.
134 Id. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 (1927)).
135 24 So. 3d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
136 See id. at 585.
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within the statutory limits, and the total "which the attorneys in the
firms contributed to the judge's reelection campaign does not
approach the $3 million contribution at issue in Caperton."137 This
case is an excellent early example of courts beginning to assess the
limits of this new constitutional standard and ensuring that only the
most extreme facts, representing egregious violations of due process,
are implicated.
Further, early cases have expounded on the limits of Caperton and
its effects on judicial bias standards. In Henry v. Jefferson County Com-
mission,138 a commissioner made disparaging statements about the
plaintiffs and then proceeded to recuse himself.13 9 Despite this
recusal, the plaintiffs argued that the commissioner's statements and
conduct tainted the impartiality of the entire tribunal, requiring
recusal by every commissioner under Caperton.14° The court rejected
this argument, emphasizing that Caperton was meant to deal with "an
extreme set of facts"'141 and that the plaintiffs' application of Caperton
to this case stretched the meaning of Caperton too far.142
If this court were to accept plaintiffs' interpretation of Caperton,
there would not be a judge or counsel in this country which could
not be impugned .... There is always some possibility that some-
thing said in front of-or to-some judge or member of an adjudi-
cative body that could bias that individual. The justice system,
however, is founded on the ability of those individuals-and
jurors-to put aside their own potential bias and look at the facts
and the law. 143
The court also noted that the question of whether remaining
members of a tribunal are biased after one member recused himself
was not before the Court in Caperton; this meant that the decision was
not instructive in the matter before the court. 4 4 This case demon-
strates the early reluctance of lower courts to extend Caperton's
probability of bias standard to different fact patterns and less extreme
apparent injustice.
In the case In re Marriage of O'Brien,'45 the husband in a divorce
proceeding charged the presiding judge with being biased against
137 Id.
138 No. 3:06-CV-33, 2009 WL 2857819 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 2, 2009).
139 Id. at *5.
140 See id.
141 Id. at *4.
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 See id. at *5.
145 912 N.E.2d 729 (Il. App. Ct. 2009).
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him (1) because the judge presided previously over criminal cases
involving the husband, including one regarding a domestic violence
charge against the husband, (2) because the judge knew the wife from
his membership at the health club where she worked, and (3) because
of the judge's friendly relationship with the wife. 146 Recognizing that
Caperton created a "tension" with Illinois case law that rests on the
"actual bias" standard criticized by the majority in Caperton,I 47 the
court nonetheless held that the husband's petition for removal was
inadequate under either standard.1 48 The ex parte communications
between the wife and judge outside the courtroom were not sufficient
to establish even a probability of bias that would violate due pro-
cess 4 9: "To say that any involuntary meeting or conversation, no mat-
ter how trivial, gives rise to cause for disqualification would present
too easy a weapon with which to.. . obtain a substitution ofjudges."150
This ruling underscores judicial reluctance to extend Caperton too rad-
ically into existing state recusal rules and to treat Caperton and its con-
stitutional due process requirements as a baseline designed to be used
only in those "rare instances.' ' 5 1
In fact, many cases focus on the "extreme facts" requirement set
out in Caperton, and the lower courts have been quick to point out
that various types of behavior do not match the extreme nature of
Blankenship's contributions to Benjamin's campaign and thus do not
rise to a constitutional level.15 2 These early cases seem to have found
146 Id. at 734.
147 Id. at 743 ("We .. .acknowledge that the case law in this area has created a
tension.").
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Hicks, 256 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ill.
1970)).
151 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009).
152 See Bradbury v. Eismann, No. CV-09-352-S-BLW, 2009 WL 3443676, at *3-4 (D.
Idaho Oct. 20, 2009) (rejecting an argument that the remainder of a judicial panel
would be biased after deliberating and conferencing with a judge who would later
recuse himself since the extreme facts necessary to implicate Caperton were not appar-
ent); Blackwell v. United States, Nos. 2:08-CV-00168, 2:04-CR-00134, 2009 WL
6315322, at *43 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2009) (holding that being a member of the same
church as a party before the court does not qualify as an extreme set of facts); Duprey
v. TwelfthJudicial Dist. Court, No. Civ 08-0756JB, 2009 WL 2482171, at *35 (D.N.M.
July 27, 2009) ("[O]nly in extreme cases will a risk of bias on the part of a judge be
sufficient to render a proceeding in front of that judge unconstitutional on due-pro-
cess grounds.... Duprey has not alleged any facts that suggest that this case is one of
those extreme ones."); Ala. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Prince, 34 So. 3d 700, 707 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009) ("[I]t is evident that Prince has not established a probability of actual bias
that is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. This case is simply not the 'rare
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a way to apply the Court's narrow holding without falling into the
traps suggested by the Chief Justice's dissent. The lower courts have
recognized that the facts in Caperton were extraordinary and that few
cases will rise to the constitutional level of due process expounded
there. On the other hand, the lower courts are beginning to answer
many of the forty questions suggested by the Chief Justice and are
beginning to define the probability of bias standard that the Chief
Justice asserted "cannot be defined in any limited way."1
5 3
In another case, Rhiel v. Hook (In reJohnson),'154 a federal bank-
ruptcy court held that Caperton applies only to recusal matters "'in the
context of judicial elections' 1 55 and that its holding is "inapposite to
the matter before this court."156 This is the first case to hold that
Caperton applies only to recusal matters emanating from judicial elec-
tions, but it remains to be seen whether or not other courts will also
find that Caperton applies only in that context. Other early cases sug-
gest that the due process requirements of Caperton apply to all recusal
matters-albeit in cases where the courts found that the facts did not
rise to the extreme circumstances in Caperton. This is a potential con-
flict over the meaning of Caperton which requires particular attention
as time passes. If future courts will only examine recusal issues in
terms of judicial elections, this case will have little precedential value.
However, if courts continue to hold that the due process recusal rules
of Caperton apply to all recusal matters, then the case clearly has the
potential for a large precedential impact in the future.
instance' in which due process demands that a judge or decision maker be disquali-
fied from a case."); People v. Aceval, 781 N.W.2d 779, 781-82 (Mich. 2010) (rejecting
a number of Caperton claims of bias that were based on the judge's former marriage to
a county prosecutor from the office obtaining the defendant's conviction and the
judge's former role as a prosecutor in the same office); see also Snider v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., Nos. 07-14751, 01-10012, 2009 WL 3101028, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22,
2009) ("Bias finding its source in the judge's view of the law or the facts of the case
itself is not sufficient to warrant disqualification."); Law v. United States, Nos.
1:08CV171, 1:06CR20, 2009 WL 1884444, at *2-3 (N.D. W. Va. June 30, 2009) (hold-
ing that adverse legal rulings and general expressions of ajudge based on trial experi-
ence regarding criminal recidivism are not grounds for disqualification); State v. List,
771 N.W.2d 644, 647 (S.D. 2009) (reasoning that a general expression of a judge's
abhorrence to alleged activities of the defendant is not a sufficient showing of the
court's partiality).
153 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
154 408 B.R. 123 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009).
155 Id. at 127 (quoting Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262).
156 Id.
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B. Limited Support for a Broader Application of Caperton
Not all judges at this early stage have been unanimous in support
of a narrow interpretation of Caperton and the type of behavior which
satisfies the "extreme facts" language. One such example from the
Michigan Supreme Court is United States Fidelity Insurance & Guaranty
Co. v. Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass 'n.157 In this case, the Michigan
Catastrophic Claims Association (MCCA) moved for the disqualifica-
tion ofJustice Hathaway on the grounds that her husband was a plain-
tiff's attorney in the field of no-fault insurance.15 8 The MCCA argued
that she had the potential for financial benefit if the case law in this
field were to shift-even though her husband was not directly
involved in this case-since this would result in higher rewards for
Hathaway's husband's clients and higher fees for attorneys. 159 Yet in
an opinion by justice Hathaway, joined by ChiefJustice Kelly and Jus-
tices Cavanagh and Weaver, she held that, after an examination of
Caperton and her own role in the case, there was no arguable, objec-
tive due process violation in this scenario.160 The MCCA's "assertion
suggests a basis for recusal that is so attenuated from the facts of these
cases that it strains reasoned logic." 161 Because neither the judge nor
anyone in her family had a real or arguable financial interest in this
case, there was no appearance of impropriety and no due process vio-
lation. 162 This opinion also suggests a narrow reading of Caperton and
strict adherence to the "extreme facts" language required to implicate
constitutional due process protection.
However, three justices either dissented or requested further
briefing on the application of Caperton to these facts and the potential
for an objective probability of bias. Justice Corrigan dissented, argu-
ing that with so little time to digest and understand the ruling of
Caperton,163 supplemental briefing on this issue was required to truly
157 773 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 2009).
158 Id. at 244.
159 See id.; see also id. at 248 (Corrigan, J., dissenting) ("[lathaway's husband] has
a direct interest that is more than de minimis in the MCCA's unlimited obligations to
reimburse insurers for personal protection insurance benefits paid to insureds who
have been catastrophically injured in automobile accidents.").
160 Id. at 244 (majority opinion) ("There is nothing alleged by the MCCA that
would cause any reasonable person to believe that there is a significant and dispropor-
tionate influence being asserted upon me under any objective analysis.").
161 Id. at 244-45.
162 Id.
163 This motion for recusal was denied on July 21, 2009, a mere month and half
after the Supreme Court handed down the Caperton decision. Id. at 243.
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test the objective probability of bias ofJustice Hathaway in this case. 164
Corrigan noted that the statements made by Hathaway regarding her
lack of bias were strikingly similar to those made by Justice Benja-
min-which the Supreme Court rejected-in Caperton.165 How is it
possible, she asks, to "decide whether these alleged facts establish that
'the probability of actual bias on the part of IJustice Hathaway] is too
high to be constitutionally tolerable' without first engaging in some
kind of independent inquiry to test the claim and Justice Hathaway's
summary denial of it?"166
Justice Young, also in dissent, agreed with Justice Corrigan and
stated her belief "that this new United States Supreme Court opinion
has radically altered the landscape ofjudicial disqualification and this
change warrants that this Court at least entertain argument by the par-
ties about how Caperton might affect the pending disqualification
motion."167 Young strongly rebuked Hathaway for her "cursory
denial" of the motion to disqualify, as well as the majority's "rote ratifi-
cation" of that denial without giving due consideration to the theory
regarding the huge profits Hathaway's husband stood to gain as an
indirect result from this case.168 This, Justice Young believed, resulted
in an "appearance of impropriety" that violates due process as
expounded in Caperton.169 Young stated that the majority had not
given an objective look at the probability and appearance of bias for
Justice Hathaway and instead incorrectly relied on Hathaway's subjec-
tive assertions that she possessed no bias against either party.170
Justice Markman also encouraged the filing of supplemental
briefs to decide this question, arguing that considering the Supreme
Court's holding in Caperton-as well as Justice Hathaway's own previ-
ous support in "propos[ing] new procedures that would require dis-
164 See id. at 246-52 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 250. Justice Hathaway remarked that "neither I nor any member of my
immediate family has any real or arguable financial interest in this case. The allega-
tions made by the MCCA are not a basis for recusal because there is no appearance of
impropriety and no due process violation." Id. at 245 (majority opinion). Justice
Benjamin similarly asserted in Caperton that he had no bias and could rule impartially
on the case, stating: "I have no pecuniary interest in the outcome of this matter.... I
have no personal involvement with nor harbor any personal antipathy toward any
party or counsel herein." See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 296
(W. Va. 2009) (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
166 U.S. Fidelity, 773 N.W.2d at 251 (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2254).
167 Id. at 253 (Young, J., dissenting).
168 See id. at 255.
169 See id.
170 See id.
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qualification whenever there is an 'appearance of impropriety' 171
"it is difficult to understand why Justice Hathaway believes that her
conclusory response to defendant's motion is sufficient."172 These
three justices all supported a more in-depth look at both the conse-
quences of the new due process requirements in Caperton and how
these standards apply to the probability of bias attached to Justice
Hathaway due to the employment of her husband. While none of the
three justices came to a decision over the merits of the MCCA's claim,
they supported the objective bias test laid out in Caperton and held
that cursory statements regarding bias are no longer sufficient when a
party raises a legitimate bias claim.
Justices Markman, Corrigan, and Young also expressed similar
concerns in another Michigan Supreme Court case, Schock v. Court of
Appeals.173 A mere eight days after their ruling in U.S. Fidelity, the
court was again confronted with the issue of how judges should
examine their relationships and conduct in recusal motions. Here, a
complaint for superintending control was denied as moot, a matter to
which all justices agreed. 174 However, speaking on the issue of dis-
qualification, Justice Weaver-who issued a concurrence that due pro-
cess was not violated by Justice Hathaway's presence in U.S.
Fidelityy 75-unilaterally held that she was not biased for or against
Schock despite their prior friendly relationship, and that, therefore,
there were no grounds for disqualification.176  Unlike Justice
Hathaway in U.S. Fidelity, Justice Weaver did not ask for her col-
leagues' approval of this decision. Justice Markman (joined by Jus-
tices Corrigan and Young), while concurring in the holding of the
case regarding the mootness of the complaint for superintending con-
trol,177 nonetheless asserted that Weaver's subjective cursory state-
ment that she is not biased for or against Schock "is clearly an
inadequate explanation for her decision . . . under the newly-estab-
lished 'objective' test" expounded in Caperton.178 This opinion again
171 Id. at 256 (Markman, J., writing separately) (quoting Order Amending Rule
2.003, Mich. Court Rules, ADM File No. 2009-04, at 2 (Mich. Nov. 25, 2009), available
at http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Resources/Administrative/2 00 9 -0 4-
112509.pdf).
172 Id.
173 768 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 2009).
174 Id. at 320-22.
175 See U.S. Fidelity, 773 N.W.2d at 245 (Weaver, J., concurring).
176 See Schock, 768 N.W.2d at 320-21 (Weaver, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 321 (Markman, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 322 n.3.
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indicates a belief in the need for a closer, objective look at a judge's
bias in order to satisfy the due process requirements in Caperton.
Since these cases, Rule 2.003 of the Michigan Court Rules has
been amended to include an appearance of impropriety standard as a
ground for recusal to be considered before the entire court.179
Despite their previous dissents in support of a closer judicial examina-
tion of the role Caperton plays in judicial recusal, Justices Corrigan and
Young believed that this rule, as amended, was unconstitutional and
refused to sit in consideration of refusal motions under this provi-
sion.180 "[Tihe duty to sit clearly cannot require official acts that
would violate our oaths to uphold the federal and Michigan constitu-
tions."18 1 Of particular concern was the amended rule's power to
allow other judges to consider whether another should be recused. 8 2
The opposing justices saw this refusal to participate as a dereliction of
duty and reasoned that personal opinions on the constitutionality of
the amended rule were irrelevant if the court has not adopted that
view.183 It appears likely that further battles will emerge in the Michi-
gan Supreme Court regarding the integration of Caperton into state
ethical and judicial rules.
Another case, Slade v. State,184 illustrates that even with an objec-
tive test in place according to state law,18 5 reasonable judges can come
to differing opinions regarding the probability of bias. Here, a defen-
dant convicted of gun possession charges moved for recusal because
of the defendant's prior dealings with the trial judge-namely, the
trial judge had both represented him as defense counsel and prose-
cuted him as an assistant district attorney.186 Also, the defendant
accused the judge of previously indicating that he would like to
"throw" the defendant away. 187 The trial judge rejected this retelling
of events and dismissed the motion for disqualification because, as a
179 MICH. CT. R. 2.003(C)(1)(b).
180 See Pellegrino v. AMPCO Sys. Parking, 789 N.W.2d 777, 786-804 (Mich. 2010)
(Corrigan, J., not participating).
181 Id. at 786.
182 Id. at 789.
183 Id. at 777 (Kelly, C.J., concurring).
184 42 So. 3d 25 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
185 Canon 3 of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct reads: "Judges should
disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might be questioned
by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances ... ." See Miss. CODE OFJUDI-
CIAL CONDuCr Canon 3E(1) & cmt. (2002).
186 Slade, 42 So. 3d at 29-30.
187 Id.
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frequent offender, the judge would have no discretion in
sentencing.188
Yet, in dissent, Judge Carlton asserted that, under the Mississippi
objective standard and the Supreme Court's holding in Caperton, "a
reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, might question
the trial judge's impartiality based on the possibility that the judge's
prior dealings with Thomas Slade caused him to have a bias or
prejudice against Slade."' 89 The dissent also rejected the trial judge's
claim that because the judge had no discretion in sentencing, the
judge's impartiality could not be questioned. "The imposition of a
sentence was not Judge Helfrich's sole duty or sole decision in this
case. Rather, this case involved various rulings during the course of
the trial" for which the defendant was entitled to an impartial tribu-
nal.190 The majority does not cite Caperton, so it is difficult to know
whether that decision played a role in their conclusions, but the objec-
tive test contained in the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct was suf-
ficiently similar to the Caperton test that the judges in this case
appeared to simply differ as to whether a reasonable person would
question the judge's impartiality after knowing all the circumstances.
Increasingly, other courts are beginning to allow specific brief-
ings on Caperton issues that may herald a new era of judicial examina-
tion into Caperton and its effects on state ethical codes. 19' It remains
to be seen whether other courts will follow this example or allow
Caperton to pass into relative obscurity.
C. Lower Courts Are Not Overwhelmed by the Number or Complexity of
Caperton Issues
Despite the differences expounded by the dissents in U.S. Fidelity,
Schock, and Slade regarding the applicability of Caperton to the cases at
bar, it is evident that, by and large, courts are beginning to craft work-
able rules to allow this new probability of bias test to take hold as a
means to counter egregious miscarriages of justice emanating from
judicial bias. Some courts remain reluctant to apply an objective test
at all, 192 yet most seem willing to begin answering some of the forty
188 Id.
189 Id. at 30 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Wis. 2010) (opinion of Abraham-
son, C.J.) (discussing the necessity of briefing and argument on Caperton's effect on
recusal motions in Wisconsin).
192 See Schock v. Court of Appeals, 768 N.W.2d 320, 320 (Mich. 2009); U.S. Fidel-
ity Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Mich.
2009).
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questions suggested by the Chief Justice in dissent. An early reading
suggests that courts are keeping true to the apparent intentions of the
majority-to save this due process protection for only the most
"extraordinary" situations. 193 As yet, no court has invoked Caperton to
require a judge to recuse himself. This is likely an implicit recogni-
tion that few instances match the extreme fact pattern of Caperton
itself. The ChiefJustice, in dissent, asserted that "hard cases make bad
law,"194 yet if courts continue to narrowly apply Caperton to only the
most extreme cases, this new due process protection could afford a
relatively simple protection against judicial bias where a judge subjec-
tively denies any exists.' 9 5
Chief Justice Roberts voiced two primary concerns: first, that
courts will be inundated with "a wide variety of Caperton motions, each
claiming the title of 'most extreme' or 'most disproportionate"' 196
and second, that this new standard "will itself bring our judicial system
into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the Ameri-
can people in the fairness and integrity of their courts." 19 7 Issues aris-
ing under this case have been relatively few. Even when such issues do
arise, they are often promptly dismissed as courts are unwilling to
extend the constitutional protections of Caperton beyond the most
extreme facts. 98 While it remains to be seen whether problems in
lower court interpretation will emerge, early signs show no prospect of
such court squabbles over Caperton interpretation.
Yet even if such issues were likely to arise, as the Chief Justice
suggests, such a situation has not previously stopped the Supreme
Court from making legal rule changes as it perceived them necessary.
An illustrative example is the Supreme Court's treatment of notice
pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly' 99 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.200 In
these cases, the Court abandoned the "no set of facts" standard to
assess the requirements of a complaint under Rule 8(a) (2).201 This
193 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).
194 See id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
195 See Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REv. 120, 132
(2009) (casting serious doubt on the presumption that Caperton will result in an over-
flow of recusal motions and litigation).
196 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 2274.
198 See, e.g., State v. Quezada-Meza, No. 1 CA-CR 07-1065, 2009 WL 1900441, at *3
(Ariz. Ct. App. July 2, 2009) (holding that a judge's comments to the jury regarding
the defendant being an illegal immigrant did not create disqualifying bias at either
the state code or constitutional level).
199 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
200 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
201 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-63.
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was essentially replaced with a standard based on the plausibility of
the complaint, despite the previous standard enjoying over fifty years
of common usage in the federal courts. 20 2 This change was fraught
with potential problems, as legal professionals nationwide were forced
to examine the extent of this change to the pleading requirements.
As one would expect, lower courts and commentators have struggled
with the parameters and guidelines which this new standard
presented.20 3 Yet nowhere in these majority opinions is there a shred
of concern for the potential difficulty that lower courts and practition-
ers will face in interpreting and applying this new standard. In fact,
the Chief Justice's fear of lower courts being "forced to deal with a
wide variety of Caperton motions" 20 4 would be far more accurate were
he to have written it about Twombly or Iqbal instead. In the years since
these cases were decided, thousands of cases have cited the decisions.
Surely if the Court were willing to bear the consequences of altering a
fundamental pleading standard, it should have no difficulty dealing
with a far less frequently used due process recusal requirement.
Another example of the Court having no hesitancy in creating
new rules overturning decades of precedent is Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.20 5 This opinion, drafted by Justice Kennedy
and also joined by Chief Justice Roberts, overturned the nearly cen-
tury-long precedent of per se illegality for resale price maintenance as
a vertical price restraint 20 6 and replaced it with a rule of reason analy-
sis in which courts are to examine the potential procompetitive effects
of the price maintenance before deciding on its illegality.20 7 In fact,
the majority illustrated its confidence in lower court interpretation of
this new rule of reason analysis by writing that "[a] s courts gain experi-
ence considering the effects of these restraints by applying the rule of
reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation
structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive
202 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
203 See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008);
Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 893 (2008);Jason Bartlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-
Defeating Effects of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73
(2009). For a thorough empirical study of the early effects of the Twombly decision,
see Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008).
204 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2273 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
205 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
206 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09
(1911).
207 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886-99.
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restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to busi-
nesses." 208 It is telling that Justice Kennedy penned both Leegin and
Caperton. His faith in the lower courts to handle these issues has not
wavered, 209 yet the Chief Justice strangely seems to believe that lower
courts are capable of in-depth economic analysis,210 but not capable
of determining when due process requires judicial recusal based on a
probability of bias standard.21'
D. The Caperton Decision Will Not Bring the Legal Profession into
Disrepute
Chief Justice Roberts's second concern is that this decision "will
itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and dimin-
ish the confidence of the American people in the fairness and integ-
rity of their courts." 21 2 Yet this assertion seems to ignore poll data that
indicates public disapproval of Justice Benjamin's actions. Polls show
that sixty-eight percent would doubt a judge's impartiality if he were
to receive a significant campaign contribution from a party before
him, and eighty-five percent believe that a judge should recuse him-
self-regardless of his partiality-if he were to receive such a contribu-
tion from a party. 213 In addition, public confidence in the judiciary
has remained quite consistent over the last thirty years. Gallup poll
data collected since January 1973 has consistently found that between
sixty-five and eighty percent of the public has either a great deal or
fair amount of trust and confidence in the judicial branch as headed
by the Supreme Court.214 Further, similar standards to that adopted
208 Id. at 898.
209 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266. While illustrating the previous instances the Court
has attached due process standards to recusal matters, Justice Kennedy uses similar
language to that used in Leegin in asserting his belief in lower court ability to address
these unanswered questions and parameters: "Courts proved quite capable of apply-
ing the standards to less extreme facts." Id.
210 Such antitrust analysis-particularly rule of reason analysis-is frequently con-
sidered among the most complex, expensive, and time-consuming practices in law.
See HERBERT HovENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 105 (2005) ("Under [the rule of
reason] courts have engaged in unfocused, wide-ranging expeditions into practically
everything about the business of large firms in order to determine whether a chal-
lenged practice was unlawful.").
211 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he standard the
majority articulates-'probability of bias'-fails to provide clear, workable guidance
for future cases.").
212 Id. at 2274.
213 See Press Release, supra note 124.
214 SeeJeffrey M.Jones, Trust in Government Remains Low, GALLuP (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/I 10458/trust-government-remains-low.aspx.
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in Caperton are already in use in many jurisdictions to govern the con-
duct of lawyers and possible conflicts of interest.
215
It is my belief that this consistently solid public support for the
judiciary will only be enhanced by judicial application of constitu-
tional safeguards as demonstrated by the majority in Caperton. Rather
than bringing the judiciary into disrepute as the Chief Justice fears,
the Court has demonstrated that an underlying sense of fairness
encompasses judicial decisions. It is important for citizens to feel con-
fident that the judiciary-and Supreme Court in particular-is capa-
ble of rendering such a judgment in cases that clearly unsettle the
public's trust in the courts and judicial integrity. It is unclear how
addressing a problem which unsettles the public will cause less trust in
the judiciary. Rather, the opposite seems true. Early empirical evi-
dence suggesting that courts have neither had difficulty applying this
new recusal standard nor been overwhelmed with motions asserting
that the standard should apply in their case supports the idea that the
Chief Justice was mistaken when he wrote that this case "will do far
more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality than an iso-
lated failure to recuse in a particular case. '216 Instead, fixing the con-
stitutional problems inherent in Justice Benjamin's actions is a more
important result, as it allows faith to be restored in the system without
overly burdening lower courts.
CONCLUSION
Only time will tell how lower courts continue to interpret the
Caperton decision. The Court set forth a new due process recusal
requirement based on the objective probability of bias, and as Chief
Justice Roberts rightly points out, courts will have to construct the
framework and scope of this requirement as new fact patterns are
presented to them. However, early signs suggest the Chief Justice was
wrong to be apprehensive about this outcome. Courts have neither
been inundated with requests for judicial disqualification-particu-
larly when compared to other recent rule changes initiated by the
Supreme Court-nor have they struggled to apply the Court's
Caperton test to the facts before them. As of yet, not a single court has
found the facts before them to have risen to the extraordinary stan-
215 See KATHLEEN MAIlER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, KEEPING Up APPEARANCES
(2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/
TPL_Appearanceoflmpropriety.pdf (detailing the continued use of the "appearance
of impropriety" standard for attorney conduct in many jurisdictions, despite its formal
removal from the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
216 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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dard of the three million dollar campaign contribution to Justice Ben-
jamin and required that anotherjudge be disqualified. This illustrates
that lower courts will only apply constitutional objective due process
standards when the facts meet the "extreme facts" level of Caperton
and that such an outcome will be understandably rare. The public
can have more faith in a system which consists of objective due process
protections against judicial recusal decisions. This will not "erode
public confidence in judicial impartiality" as the Chief Justice sug-
gests; rather, it will enhance public confidence while providing a nec-
essary check on radical judicial impartiality.
